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Hume's Problem - 'acceptance' from Velleman (2000). . The doxastic effects thesis allows us to answer Hume's Problem, by
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't win the lottery this weekend. Y ' ' ' ' - - 'believing that ' then , we need only recognise that the predicate 'is true' is redundant in the - . But adding the predicate 'is true' narrow the 'thought' - 'is true' draws our - - - Velleman's discussion of acceptances appears in his influential paper 'On the Aim of Belief' (2000b). the themes discussed in Velleman's seminal paper. 'On the Aim of Belief' takes centre stage in Part I. As far as I' . Hume aims to 'discover more fully the nature of belief', nature distinguishes beliefs from other ways of 'conceiving' ideas (Book I, . Now, while Hume's own solution to this problem - -as Hume's Problem. ering Hume's Problem, with the our beliefs with an 'additional force and vivacity' 'weak and languid' (Book I, Part III, §7). However, this doesn't - - use 'true belief' synonymously with 'correct belief' and likewise for 'false belief' and 'incorrect belief'. sa Wikforss' t are beliefs? (Hume's Problem) - (as per Bernard Williams' Thus, on a teleological account, Hume's Problem is solved according to the proposed aim It is 'characteristic of beliefs that they aim at truth' (Williams 1970). - - - the mechanisms that help realise belief's aim are 'presumably naturally selected' (p. 510). However, while I agree with a broadly evolutionary approach to to Hume's Problem and For the normativists, Hume's Problem that we don't sake of argument, even if that thing is false, then it doesn't make sense to say my - - - argument in favour of this position is the norm's explanator they have developed is unclear. I won't take too much time, in this respect, to analyse how eory of belief. To answer Hume's problem, I - - - - relation between belief and truth. On this understanding, it's not clear that - - - 'derivative from' besides a discussion of McHugh's φ φ 'a person belief at the truth, by forming it in an act of judgement' (p. aim: 'the su aim is derivative from the more fundamental aim of belief: knowledge' (p. - ), 'what one normally means by "intending to form a belief" is intending to accept a proposition if and only if that proposition is true' - - of people's beliefs are formed through subconscious processes of *: An acceptance φ is a belief if and only if either: Petersen's claim that the truth of a proposition is to believe it is problematic. However, for now the important thing to note is the teleologists' . I discuss the teleologists' appeal to natura (a) a subject forms φ (in deliberation) with the intention to hold φ with content (b) a subject forms φ due to subconscious processes that regulate φ for content subject's explicit intention to hold that belief only if entertain 'a question of the form " ?" true...' (p. 252)- Petersen's initial statement (cited above) that intending to form a belief involves 'intending to accept a proposition if and only if that proposition is true'. However, - Again, it's important to note here Hume's Problem is solved according to these conditions. However, before in belief formation, those that regulate for truth, were 'presumably naturally selected'. But - further with his appeal to 'design' by natural selection, by talking about the function to be true: they are 'metaphorically speaking, designed to be true' (Velleman imp on the details. I thus won't say anything more about the ' - the teleologist's account of belief is wrong, then so must be their account of doxastic - - - - You don't know the answer for sure, but if you guess correctly you will win - I've increased the population from Owen's example. In 2017, guessing whether the population is over 7 ve things we don't take to be true. This doesn't mean - - beginning to get sad, then beginning to form intentions about what he's going to do about tance, Kendall Walton's discussion of imagistic and propositional imagining in his truth just causes the attitude of 'imagining' to be a belief, and not really an instance of - thus Walton (1990) writes: '...imagining something is 'Imagining what I know to be true, after all, isn't problematic' (p. 156). Thus, I do not

- - amounts to. Consider again that you're at work, and that you've been staring at a computer screen for hours. This time, however, without intending to do so (you're trying to focus I won't focus again on guessing, because I'm not sure what it would mean to subconsciously guess. - focus on the individual's explicit intention to imagine only the truth. - might say that what' - - shows us that a common assumption is that: 'one has no control over whether or not one would succeed in performing [that action]' 007, p. 534). So, to use Keith Frankish's example, we cannot intend to pick a - - My question, however, is what work the notion of 'indirect' belief formation is doing here. If 'indirectly' the teleologists are right, these methods are indirect. But this isn't cannot be what's at stake here. Instead, if the teleologists mean by 'indirectly' that these in Jonathan Bennett's (1990) race of desires, preferences, or biases, even though we don't realise at the time problem with the teleologist's thesis. the teleologist's dilemma - - -what are they to make of Shah's dilemma, and in of belief in favour of Shah's suggestion: that beliefs are essenti at least partly conducive to satisfying the individual's primary aim to believe the truth. Petersen's account, then, these Let's begin with the first problem, which is slightly tangential to our concern in this - for instance that you are reading a newspaper and don't want to see last night's football turning to the wrong page, you inadvertently see the result, and can't help but form a game's score regulate for truth (assuming that the paper is reliable) despite you actively Petersen's proposal, which is more central to our - Petersen's - , if we don't hide the item well Petersen's analogy serves to

- - Petersen's appeal to a second belief In summary, the teleologist's thesis that beliefs - plausible answer to Hume's Problem. Beliefs are not acceptances that aim at the truth in - ef, we focus exclusively on considerations pertaining to the truth of that belief's - - Petersen's (2009) insistence that the aim of belief can Noordhof's (2013) . The second is Conor McHugh's (2012, 2013) rejection of φ is aim motivated only if deliberation about whether to φ can be weighed twelve hours a day you decide to respect your wife's wishes and play just eig - - Petersen's (2009) reply to the exclusivity objection, but it just so happens that it always wins out over our other aims. However, I don't of both aims simultaneously. In this case, one or more of an individual's ai during October and your aim to get drunk at your friend's birthday party on October 23 - - may face various obstacles. For instance, the matter of how 'practically feasible' it is to Petersen's when 'one comes to realise that the aim would be incompatible with, or detract from the feasibility of some other aim' (p. 403). For example, Steglich By proposing that the aim of belief can be weighed in these ways, it's important to note that Steglich Petersen's account, pragmatic consideratio Petersen's position to hold, he must rely on an implausible formulation of the propositions would require us 'to fill our minds up with loads and loads of useless, trivial truths', and Petersen's examples of taking up or giving up the aim of belief to count as genuine cases of belief's aim being weighed, he must be committed - n's examples, nd Noordhof's own words: 'Since the truth aim does not require that we form beliefs, it does not go into the balance when we consider the question whether it is worthwhile to form a belief' (p. 455). tation of belief's aim, which - practical limitations. Nevertheless, as stated, this version of belief's aim is completely - - Petersen's implausible interpretation of belief's aim can be weighed against other aim I now turn my attention to McHugh's alternative attempt to undermine the exclusivity Rejecting Exclusivity: McHugh's Pragmatism Central to McHugh's (2012, 2013) response to the exclusivity objection is the debate To see how this unfolds, we first need to have a clear view of McHugh's teleological in turn. Finally, I show why McHugh's McHugh's Teleological Thesis - state's nature to be regulated, either through conscious reasoning or through non that operate in a person's explicit intention (in conscious reasoning) or in his subconscious gives belief's aim a literal reading as opposed to a me : 'The teleological conception thus takes im... that is constitutive of belief' (p. 370). on McHugh's account, are not beliefs. This is an important McHugh's teleological thesis really diverges from the truth that: 'To beli belief that, by your own lights, doesn't amount to knowledge' (p. 382). This gives an important role to evidence in the knowledge aim. You must 'by your own lights' (i.e. So, if you don't think your evidence is sufficient for knowing that , you won't be able to truth, in the sense we were discussing in previous sections. He writes that 'the suggestion fundamental aim of belief: knowledge'. on McHugh's account, beliefs also at gh's knowledge φ is a belief only if φ is regulated for the truth McHugh's evidence for a belief. To be specific, McHugh (2013) writes that 'your ' (p. friendship, and think that believing in your friend's guilt will damage that friendship. Th ave sufficient evidence to do so; or you can withhold belief in your friend's ciding whether to believe in, or withhold belief about, your friend's guilt. - principle, I'll begin with an analogy. Imagine that your aim is to buy a new car, and you wife says it's a waste of money. In this case, focuses on McHugh's claim - aims into the picture. I have sympathy with Archer's objection; however, I put it to one side because I want - aim by believing in your friend's guilt, because by hypothesis you have what you would because you don't want to risk ruining your friendship. Thus, by not believing in your riend's guilt, you are rejecting the knowledge - belief in your friend's guilt (you have sufficient evidence to do so!). our friend's when the evidence suggests your friend is guilty, that you don't want to believe it (and so withhold belief) because you don't want to ruin However, for McHugh's defence against the exclusivity objection to go through, withheld If it did not, then McHugh's examples would not show that the a considered, then, McHugh's attempt to avoid the exclusivity objection fails - - Summary of 'Aims' - I, they fail to give a plausible answer to Hume's Problem and, relatedly, a plausible account - e to count as a belief. Bennett's adequately to Owens' exclusivity For these reasons, I hold that the teleological thesis fails to answer Hume's Problem. We provide reasons for rejecting the teleologist's accou ' to truth' (p. 182, italics original). In today's terminology, this amounts to - φ is a belief if and only if φ is governed I won't get φ is a belief if and only if φ Those who take the first approach do so as a response to the teleologist's dilemma, which solution to) the teleologist's dilemma. can deal with Hume's Problem and the nature of doxastic correctness such that we cannot answer Hume's Problem with reference to the norm of belief, then - this question in any detail. Instead, I'll just point out, as I did with the teleologists, that plausibility of Pascal Engel's (2013a, c) response to the problems. I argue, in particular, that Engel's responses are ultimately unsuccessful. - - belief, since norms don't apply However, notice that you don't have to give to charity: y ible norm to satisfy. We just can't read a day, I can't! inquiry, such as 'one ought to on one's evidence for a belief', since we have control over whether to perform such - - - 'a bit of a red herring' (p. 46). Yet - 'Do X when in C'. So, we want to know whether we can be g - - when the 'high' is understood as a price. In this sense, whether we are in a position to 'sell high' is not 'transparent' to us (to use Boghossian's term). Nevertheless, we can still be guided by the norm to buy low and - . As Boghossian (2003) writes: 'The truth is what you ough attained it' (p. 39). norms, despite Boghossian's claim. While with other objective norms we can consider what to believe. The problem is that 'circumstance C, in this case, refers to the truth of a proposition' (p. 4 now I'll believe that p - is true, you do not then consider the normative 'ought' and submit to its - 'walk away' from a move in a game, we don't necessarily make it- sts' appeal to constitutive norms to save normativism does not succeed against At this point, I consider and reply to Engel's attempt to avoid the no normative in the sense that it ' prescribe that we ought to believe what is true and only what is true' (En However, we should not be too quick to accept Engel's solution to the no When developing his position, Engel approvingly cites Hilary Kornblith's (2001) account we look to Kornblith's work, we see that i as prescriptions, they must still 'in some sense be responsive to human capacities' suc 'play some role in guiding action' (p. it would 'thereby lose its capacity to play a constructive action guiding role' (p. 238). To On this much, Engel (2013c) agrees: 'I agree with the critics of normativism that the norm f truth has to make a difference. Ideal ought cannot be completely alien to can' (p. 211). On the other hand, idealisations 'cannot be so closely tied to what particular individuals of performing in ideal ways' (Kornblith 2001, p. 238). At this extreme, we see on tied to our abilities in a broad sense, such that they must be satisfiable 'in principle' (Engel §1 & §2) discusses this example, with a particular focus on Feldman's (2001) interest in - solution to the objection from doxastic involuntarism. Interpreted as an ideal, we don't - that 'only certain imaginary beings endowed with powers which are distinct from ours follow ([for instance] logical saints [and] perfectly rational agents)' (p. 209). advantage of Engel's notion of the truth - - three 'decrees' are plausible indicators of whether our beliefs are regulated by the truth is true. Engel's thought is that our belief forming processes exhibit transparency) 'one ' Given this thought, whether we accept Engel's (and for that matter Shah's [2003]) - However, we don't assume because of this transparency that concept such that bachelors ought not to be married; and we don't say that bachelors are that don't bear on the truth of a proposition, namely pragmati ' the default mode of our belief formation' (Engel 2013c, p. 207). Again, however, it's not clear why our acceptance of evidenti houldn' wer that he isn't, because he has two sisters, then you 's sisters are irrelevant to our beliefs. He writes: 'The commitment to the truth it entails that [you] should be prepared to give one' (p. 212). - ' it is widely accepted that ' 's forming of 's practical reasoning' (p. 55). So, if a 'reasons n' must be available that explains ' ' (P2) To φ is in accordance with (C) You want to φ. φ The term 'pro attitude' is taken from Donald Davidson (1963) and refers to attitudes such as desires, φ becomes: 'To believe that norm'. This creates a problematic inference because ' R' - 'The regress ...poses a whatever' 'depends on nothing more than the idea that rule rms of the subject's attitudes in combination with the governed' With this second objection from normative impotence outlined, I now show why Engel's Engel's Reply - - - n terms of the regress of rules objection, Engel's idea is that-just as we don't n -we don't need to have beliefs about ... in order Engel's attempts to avoid the o - - - why we can't just give a descriptive account of the doxastic practic - - appeals to the original notion of transparency to avoid the problem. Nonetheless, it's not Summary of 'Norms' - - norm just doesn't , Engel's attempt to avoid this problem by appealing to transparency doesn't help, b , which in turn means that we cannot answer Hume's Problem by (i) What are beliefs? (Hume's Problem). - Hume's Problem. - - - developing the motivational role thesis in more detail, I consider Velleman's reasons for hasty, given Velleman's observat - - - answer Hume's Problem.

theories of belief. He metaphorically describes beliefs as 'maps of neighbouring spac which we steer' (p. 238). At face value, this metaphor capture - metaphor is vague; and it isn't until D. Armstrong fully commits to defending a version of Ramsey's metaphor, writing that it represents his own theory of belief 'in miniature' (p. 3). Specifically, Armstrong dra 4). Let's consider each of these aspects in turn. 'totality of a man's beliefs at a particular time as a single great map' which embraces 'all space and all time, past, present and future, together with anything else that the believer takes to exist', with the believer's present self 'as its central reference point' (p. 3). Of course, despite the be understood as a theory of belief, with the potential to solve Hume's Problem. This is where the second aspect of Ramsey's metaphor is relevant: beliefs are maps maps are 'action ing' (Armstrong 1973, p. 4); head south to Dorne after reading G. R. R. Martin's series Armstrong's words: 'beliefs are maps of the world in light of which we are prepared to act' (p. 4). Thus, we begin to see the acceptances (or, in Armstrong's terminology, merely what he calls the 'standard ' as follows: , Van Leeuwen's characterisation also introduces us to - truth's doesn't quite fact is we don't just act on the basis of any relevant belief - φ strong desires, φ causes and rationalises actions that will satisfy of φ is true. - - Second, beliefs don't always motivate alone, alongside desires. Often, beliefs motivate point out that an acceptance is a belief if it can motivate as one of a set of a subject's φ of a subject S's set of beliefs if members of S's belief set, φ φ that other forms of acceptance do, in fact, share belief's motivational properties. As such, normative theories). Rather, we can characterise belief by continuing to focus on belief's , we need to know more about Velleman's reasons motivate just like beliefs. In particular, he looks at 'the context of child's play, in which imagining disposes [a] child to pretend' (p. 256). to be an elephant. According to Velleman, the child's imaginings about being an elephant, his imagining 'disposes him to behave as would be desirable if he were an elephant' were true. Thus, Velleman's example is supposed to show that imaginings share don't think theorist's general approach. Perhaps if other acceptances share belief's motivational properties, they do not motivate Velleman's departure from the motivational theory of belief is Velleman's rejection of any hope of distinguishing beliefs according to their motivational - distinction between belief's motivational role and the motivational role of other Now, although I think Van Leeuwen's practical ground relation is more or 4) and Lucy O'Brien (2005). Van Leeuwen's practical ground relation: depend on the agent's being in a certain practical setting to b less correct, I won't enter into a detailed φ is a belief only if φ occupies a fundamental role a subject's -and I'll between them. I say 'minimally' because this relation may hold more broadly between attitudes; but I won't By saying that beliefs are 'fundamental' I mean that they possess contents from the contents of our beliefs. For example, think again about Velleman's coke? It's because he has - - true beliefs about what we accept. The child might think 'elephant' refers to something I don't, you can't. φ is a belief only if φ couldn't have those acceptances unless φ But as beliefs don't motivate action, they don't φ is a belief only if φ acceptances, such that a subject couldn't have those acceptances unless φ At this point, it's worth pointing out that I am not trying to deny with the fundamentality 'depressingly unchildlike' of child's pretense Hume's Problem. are responsible for motivating actions. So, the child pretends to be an elephant because he thinks: 'If I were an elephant, I would act like this'. For all I have said, this could Solving Hume's Problem φ is a member of a subject S's set of beliefs if members of S's belief set, φ φ φ acceptances, such that a subject couldn't have those φ way that I have described them above, is my solution to Hume's Problem. - of functions. I don't take a side in this debate, instead I argue that from either perspective, - ly normative, and so don't include normative Thus, I argue in the systemic theorists' favour that functions are not essentially normative, - - functions descends from Larry Wright's (1973, 1976) influential work. Wright's main contribution to the literature is to suggest that functions are 'intrinsically... explanatory' (1973, p. 154). When we ascribe functions to devices we right, an 'important kind of explanation' (p. 154). For example, statements can be 'called upon to there', by which he means: 'something like' why an artefact or organism has a certain functional device, why that device 'is where it is', or why that device character of Wright's theory. head, because of that feature's capacity to knock nails into hard surfaces (i.e. its functions); - - , both artefacts and organisms are attributed functions, on Wright's theory, in the etiologists' proposal 's type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of 's variables, and I have changed the term 'proper function' (which is often used by the etiologists) for the equivalent 'etiological function'. a device's selective history, there must have been variation in that device, and organisms selected for implies that D increased O's that is, when they did not contribute to an organism's differential fitness. And this may 's 's lineage. attributes functions 'more liberally' than the strong thesis (Bull historically contributed to an organism's of an organism's ancestors organism's ancestors (so that the device was ant advance on Cummin's initial characterisation. Thus, Davies' with Davies' characterisation from here onwards: Where " " refers to the analysis of system where " " refers to the systemic capacity we wish to explicate, 's capacity to 's capacity to Cummins (1983, p. 31). However, Davies' contribution is to make systemic 'l level' components contribute to the higher ), with a focus on the leg's role in enabling us to walk (the system's capacity level components, such as the leg's muscles, tendons, bones; i contribute to the leg's role in enabling us to walk. Insofar as these components do have the patella's functions See Davies (2001, p. 89). I have changed some of Davies' variables for continuity. For Cummins own aiding knee extension; (ii) is in part satisfied by specifying the patella's function, but will 's components analysis of the leg; (iv) applies because the analysis appeals to the patella's functional role - In the following, I don't take a stand on which project is correct, rather I argue that from 'describe the criteria of application that members of [a] linguistic y generally have (implicitly or explicitly) in mind when they use [a] term' change, spontaneous creation, or 'unparalleled saltation' (p. 74). irst problem is William Harvey's the publication of Darwin's organism possessed a photoreceptive cell for the first time, and used that cell's capacity devices etiological functions. One example is Donald Davidson's Swampman. 4). Davidson's original reason for introducing Swampman concerns problems relating to readily apply. In the case of Harvey's functional statements about the heart, it's reasonable e same way as an ordinary human's heart. So, 'contemporary biologists' have in mind when they make function statements, thus limiting Darwinian's and ordinary people about functions, are irrelevant to how Neander (1991a) writes: 'Scientific notions are not static' (p. - - - not apply when the analysis is restricted to specialist language. Nonetheless, Neander's devices are. At some point in an organism's evolutionary history, it must possess a Second, we can't out by stressing that conceptual analysis 'cannot be done by deed poll' (p. 176). Her reason concepts that they don't explicitly recognise as rules. To this end, she gives an analogy: explicitly in mind when they use the notion of a "proper [etiological] function"... That a - ven when we don't know what those rules are. But Neander's analogy here is a little biologists. So, given Neander's project- - must have etiological functions in mind, even if they don't realise it. This approach is usly Neander's suggestion to analyse how contemporary biologists use functions, and not etiological functions, are 'ineliminably involved in ongoing research programs' and Lauder point out that while theorists often talk about the 'evolution of function', they functions as 'conceptually similar to structures'- to a systemic reading of functions (p. 463). Given Amundson and Lauder's analysis, then, Neander's shift in focus . This is Millikan's (1989) suggestion 'a confused program, a philosophical chimera, a squaring of the circle [and so on...]' (p. 290). Millikan's thought is that the discovery of evolution b This general approach, as with Neander's, is intended to avoid some of the early as 'gold' because of how since Harvey was writing about the heart's function pre - - - part because of the heart's ability to circulate blood, so we attribute to the heart that kidney's function system; the patella's function is to aid knee extension, this contributes to fitness, but also - to have discovered the 'proper' functions of biological devices. Given, then, that the - is that often the devices are 'ancient' with selective histories that extend back 'hundreds of millions of years' (p. 461). In these cases, the information we need to determine the - difficulty that is 'insurmountable when dealing with fossil taxa or ancient structures' (p. Such experiments don't require any information about the evolut - - - - normativity. On the other hand, the systemic theorists don't think functions are essentially ative, and for this reason don' ly normative. If they are not, then we don't need a theory of don't just say that it circulates blood, but that it is don't just see, they are its function (I'll refer to devices that are diseased, damaged, or defective - - - - 'nature effectively experiments' (p. 2 device has 'the "purpose" of doing X' (p. 516 state 'what a device is supposed to do' (p. some way towards satisfying nature's purpose they are - kind of replacement for God: 'one of Darwin's important discoveries is that we can think a designer' (p. 380). N Perhaps Darwin's central insight was to explain how highly complex organisms emerge 'highly regular and highly complex hierarchical systems', that those systems are in some sense designed (p. 5). However, it's likely that this inclination towards natural design is ccepting that there isn't a - - - - I can't see any reason to accept, despite the initial force of the intuition - - question the credibility of the etiologist's particular, I focus on a recent defence of the etiologist's account of normativit doesn't have (or no long more specific terms, Davies' argument can be reconstructed as follows: 's ancestors. 's ancestors if absorb oxygen, assuming that functions are normative. However, if Davies' argument is - - pts the weight of Davies' objection, but she denies that the only target fitness enhancing properties, but also the 'underlying heritable physical ty]' (p. 9). Bissett, this physical configuration is the 'primarily heritable' feature of a device, meaning that the survival enhancing property is 'only heritable at gives rise to [it]' (p. 9). n't specifically endorse that condition. I won't go into the details of Davies' argument for this premise here, as I am more Bissett's response, and she takes no issue with (P1.ii). 'possession of the physical [a] physical feature need not necessitate possession of [a] enhancing one' (p. 9). Bissett's suggestion is as follows: 3,...,} 3,...,} 3, ...,} Bissett's original condition reads 'iii. was ing', which demonstrates a commitment to the strong etiological thes Bissett's proposal in terms of the weak etiological thesis. Bissett's more specific - - al thesis, any 'one of a set' of structural properties shared let's say, the relevant set of structural 'glob of misplaced organic matter' (p. 25). Then only properties is the case, then we don't want to say that a glob of misplaced organic matter is a member required, otherwise we don't have anything like a lung. st be 'within a range considered a r which performed F' (p. 10), this range captures 'those [devices] which come pretty close to being well but nevertheless go awry' (p. 11). These additional - 'reasonable range' of the properties required to produce a particular device, we are talking - tural thesis delineate and kind and that '[p]ast ing, which is adaptive' (p. 11). However, she doesn't seem to real Bissett's structural properties, we can't rely Bissett thinks a device's intrinsic structural Bissett remains decidedly neutral, suggesting that 'there are no doubt numerous properties' (p. 10). However, she does pick a likely candidate for these appeal to 'an appropriate range of gene expression associated with recent ancestral which performed F' (p. 11). O 'Gene expression' refers to the process by which infor Bissett's more specific proposal. Moreover, if the role Bissett says, 'to produce' devices, then it is difficult - - etiological thesis above, so for those reasons I don't think we - heart's (lower system's (higher because of the heart's ability to perform - - - - , ... 'lower level' 'higher level' - - level) functioning of the circulatory system. It's just that - - φ is a member of a subject S's set of beliefs if members of S's belief set φ φ motivate, to return to Ramsey's metaphor, is by providing us with 'a map of neighbouring space'. Our beliefs, in this respect, serve to s. They don't guide own ways. We can say, then, that a belief's motivational role is to provide - have roughly true beliefs about one's environment... If a Mack truck is about to hit you,

- - species). And, although I won't say much about this claim here, it is plausible. For instance, hasn't historically - are responsible for contributing to the population's stability, only true beliefs come out φ is a belief only if φ acceptances, such that a subject couldn't have those acceptances unless φ don't - survival and reproduction as a species. I won't defend this claim in detail here, but it does -

acceptance, such as to answer Hume's Problem (see Se what beliefs are (Hume's Problem), and why we hav that 'true belief' is used interchangeably with 'correct belief', as well as 'false belief' and 'incorrect belief'; however, this is not because of an e - - don't - - - - isn't home). As such, knowing that a true belief will further the other's end, by giving - perspective of the doxastic effects thesis, whether the belief's content is true or false. -it doesn't perform any. True, it doesn't meet our socially determined standard of correct belief, but it is essentially defective. It just doesn't make sense to talk about the belief that way. And I am here echoing Papineau's (1999, p. - there are no cigarettes in the cupboard. Here, the smoker's fals owever, think that there is a 'sense in which' false beliefs are incorrect, but he thinks, in line with what I call the thin reading of doxastic correctness, that this is just because we take 'false belief' to be analogous with 'incorrect belief'. consequences. Let's begin by considering a hypothetical of how this can come about. members of the tribe, however, don't fully understand the nature of the beasts that attack - as to say that they are 'pervasive'. On no effects (when they don't perform their function) and can even have beneficial effects, of 'Functions' by addressing Hume's Problem. In answer to how beliefs can be distinguished from other -thus they allow us to answer Hume's Problem.

on't take any action; likewise, if we withhold a belief, then we don't form any belief. If this is true, then there is little sense in asking whether a theory of belief's conditions apply to suspension this doesn't seem qui - -you'd never even thought And by the same token: 'We don't come into the world agnostic or suspending judgment about where bumblebees hibernate during winter' (p. 168). So, we don't use ; or when we don't consciously delib I've altered the content of one of Friedman's examples, but the sentiment is the same. I use 'suspension' synonymously with Friedman's 'agnostic' and 'suspended judgment'. . We don't suspend towards suggests, has the primary aim to hit his target. This is analogous to the believer's aim to (i.e. the believer's primary aim to hit the target involved in believing). order aim arises because the hunter doesn't jus order aim can cause the hunter to 'intentionally... and deliberately forbear' from taking a shot, so as to 'avoid failure' concerning his primary aim - doesn't make sense to talk of individuals who have never had a proposition cross their as being in a state of suspension towards that proposition. Yet, Sosa's account oesn't make suspension anything more than the mere absence of belief. Suppose that we a gives? I don't see that it order aim is avoiding to have false beliefs, then we don't need same work. As such, from Sosa's perspective, susp Hence, Sosa's development of the truth . It prescribes withholding belief. But isn't belief then under the governance of the evidential norm...? It is, but it is is 'under the governance' of the truth , Engel runs into a problem similar to Sosa's- norm, it doesn't to swing your leg at the ball if you don't thin -at least, you are not required to do so according to the 'kick norm' alone. Similarly, even if believing the evidence is what we ought to do in norm, it doesn't then follow that we ought also to form - - you that he knows the evidence suggest that he won't win, yet he believes it nonetheless. iend's - Imagine that it's now 7pm, and you want to get set off at 7.40pm. However, you're not sure whether you will bump into a f way, who will want to talk for a while; you don't believe it will happen, but you don't - action. If you weren't suspending about whether you will bump into a - - - Summary of 'Suspended Belief' Despite Sosa's appeal to second beliefs. And concerning Engel's defence of a normative theory of suspension, we saw that - It doesn't make suspension anything more than the absence of belief, which conflicts with our assumption that suspension is an attitude. And second, it's not clear that questions: what beliefs are (Hume's Problem); why we Owens' exclusivity objection- , it's not clear how can't be genuinely In response to Hume's Problem, necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for answering Hume's Problem. With a – . London: King's College Publications – - - - - - - - - - - – - - - - - - – - - - - - - - - - - – -